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IX. Patents
A.

Summary Judgments and Patent ValidityBarofsky v. General Electric Corp.,
396 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1968).

1
Barofsky v. General Electric Corporation,
a design patent case,
presented the questions of whether the validity of a design patent
should be decided as a matter of law or as a matter of fact and
whether summary judgment would be a proper remedy for declaring
a design patent invalid. These interrelated problems have created
substantial difficulties for the courts. The question whether validity of a design patent should be decided as a matter of law has been
a problem about which there has been much discord. 2 The difficulties
inherent in granting summary judgment arise from semantic problems in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 The
Barofsky case presents the problems in a peculiarly acute manner
since a dissenting opinion by Judge Ely attacks the mode by which
the majority disposes of the case.
The Barofsky case was an action by the holder of a design patent
against a corporation alleged to have infringed upon that patent. The
Ninth Circuit has defined a patentable design as a manufacturable
item which is (1) new, (2) original, (3) ornamental, (4) non-obvious to
person skilled in the art, and (5) not primarily functional. 4 In short,
it is something out of the range of the routine. One who has infringed upon the patent must respond in damages for past infringements.5 An injunction will generally issue to protect against future
infringements.
Barofsky's patent was entitled "Television Cabinet or Similar

1 396 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1968).
2 Compare Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1964),
with Griswold v. Oil Capital Valve Co., 375 F.2d 532, 538 (10th Cir. 1966).
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The rule provides as follows: "The judgment
sought [on a motion for summary judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. ..."
4 Barofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 342 (9th Cir. 1968); cf.
35 U.S.C. § 171 (1964), which merely requires the elements of "newness,"
"originality," and "ornamentality."
5 35 U.S.C. § 289 (1964).
6 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1964).
[1106]
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Article,"7 and the design consisted of a rectangular box-like central
cabinet with a smaller inner space, presumably for a television screen.
The doors were shallow rectangular boxes approximately one-half the
width and one-third the depth of the cabinet. These doors were
hollow and were used to hold speakers. The outer edges were
beveled in such a manner that they could be opened to a greater
angle than normal doors.8
General Electric's defense to the claim of infringement was that
the allegations were false and that the patent was invalid.9 It
sought a declaratory judgment to that effect. 10 The issue raised by
this defense-invalidity of the patent-had to be resolved before the
court could rule on Barofsky's claim of infringement. If General
Electric's defense were to succeed, it would be a complete bar to
Barofsky's claim. Hence, a thorough examination of the beforementioned definition of a patentable design was necessary in order to
determine validity. The declaratory judgment sought by General
Electric would be granted if any of the criteria of the definition were
lacking.
The substantive issue thus defined created no controversy between the majority and the dissenting opinions in Barofsky. The
substantive discussion, however, is secondary to the real issue of the
case-its procedural disposition. The district court granted summary
judgment to General Electric, reciting Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure," placing its decision on the ground that the design was neither ornamental nor inventive.12 The Ninth Circuit,
rather than affirm on the same ground as that of the district court,
rested its decision on the ground that the design served a primarily
functional purpose.' 3 The court rationalized the apparent new basis
for invalidity on the ground that the district court's opinion evidenced
a determination that the essential elements of the design served a
primarily functional or utilitarian purpose. 14 Judge Ely, in dissent,
addressed himself to three points: First, the disposition of the case
in this manner determined the invalidity of the patent as a matter of
law whereas he felt a genuine issue of fact was presented; second,
7 396 F.2d at 341.
8 Id at 341-42.

9 Id. at 341.
10 Id.

11 FED. R. CIr. P. 56(c).
12 396 F.2d at 342.
13 Id. The requirement of non-functionality is not an easy concept to
define. The major emphasis must be on the decorative arts, but the Ninth
Circuit has held that the mere fact that decoration must be emphasized does
not imply that the design cannot additionally serve a useful purpose. See
Robert W. Brown & Co. v. DeBell, 243 F.2d 200, 202-03 (9th Cir. 1957).
14 396 F.2d at 342.
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the theory of the holding of the majority differed from the theory of
the holding of the district court; and finally, the cases on which the
majority relied were not ones in which the disposition was by summary judgment. 5
Summary judgment is a creature of statute. 6 The rule which
governs summary judgments, though easy to state, presents definitional problems. The rule provides that the judgment should be
rendered forthwith if "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and.., the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law ... '17 When considering the motion of summary judgment,
conclusions of law must be drawn while weighing the available data
in the light most favorable to the person opposing the motion.' 8 To
apply the rule, one must define what is a genuine issue, what is a
material fact, and when the judgment can be entered as a matter of
law.' 9 In seeking to apply the rule, courts find no problem in determining what is a material fact or, in non-patent cases,2 0 whether
15 Id. at 345. Note that the same procedural dilemma could arise in a
suit by the manufacturer for a declaratory judgment that his conduct does
not infringe upon an existing patent or, in the alternative, that the patent is
invalid. In that situation, there is an initial problem since the plaintiff must
show that there is a justiciable controversy. See Welch v. Grindle, 251 F.2d
671 (9th Cir. 1957); Wembley, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87 (2d
Cir. 1963), discussed in Note, Patents: Finding a Justiciable Controversy in
Suits for Declaratory Judgment of Invalidity or Non-infringement-Wembley, Inc. v. Superba Cravats,Inc. (2d Cir. 1963), 51 CALF. L. REv. 805 (1963).
16 The provision is found in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
17 FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (c).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Poller
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); Technograph
Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elec. Inc., 356 F.2d 442, 446-47 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 950 (1966). The rule has been stated conversely in
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. International Harvester Co., 272 F.2d 139 (7th Cir.
1959): "[The district court has the duty to] resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact against the party moving for
summary judgment." Id. at 142.
19 For an able discussion of the problems encountered under Rule 56(c),
see Asbill & Snell, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules When an
Issue of Fact is Presented, 51 MlcH. L. REv. 1143 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
Asbill & Snell].
20 Patent cases seem to present a peculiar problem in this area. Some
courts have taken the position that the status of the patent must be speedily
determined. These courts bend over backwards to grant summary judgment.
E.g., Ballantyne Instruments & Electronics, Inc. v. Wagner, 345 F.2d 671, 672
(6th Cir. 1965). On the other hand, some courts take the opposite extreme.
These courts grant a summary judgment in a patent case only rarely.

E.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Sprague Elec. Co., 264 F. Supp. 930, 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
But note that the same result is not always reached when the patented article
is a design. The same court that decided Fujitsu once had occasion to say:
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judgment should be rendered as a matter of law.21 A real problem
exists, however, when an attempt is made to define the concept of
"genuine issue" as to a material fact.22 It has been said that neither
the statement (for example, in an answer) that a genuine issue as to a
material fact exists nor the introduction of counter-affidavits will
preclude summary judgment in a proper case.23 The opposing considerations of economy in the judicial process and of a thorough
presentation of the issues must be weighed by the judge. The court
on the
must also consider the possibility that the threat of a trial
24
merits would be used as harassment to coerce a settlement.
Subordinate to the issue of summary judgment is the issue
whether the validity of the patent should be decided as a matter of
law. Of course, when summary judgment is granted, the underlying
issues are decided as a matter of law. Hence, granting the motion
of one seeking summary judgment in a patent case is a decision that
the patent is invalid as a matter of law. In this area, there seems to
be a substantial semantic problem.
25
There is little uniformity among the circuits and little consist-

ency within the Ninth Circuit as to the proper terms which should
be employed. 26 A comparison of the language of the Ninth Circuit
cases seems to indicate an indiscriminate interchange of the terms
"invention" and "validity." As late as 1957, the court stated that
"this court has consistently held that the question of validity of a
claim of a patent is one of fact."2 7 In 1961, the court rephrased
this conclusion and said that "[w] hile invention is a question of law,
28
It seems
the questions of validity often turns on questions of fact.1

at this point that the court is being very careful to distinguish be"Since a design patent protects appearance, not utility ... the validity of a
design patent is peculiarly susceptible of determination on a motion for sum-

mary judgment." Alex Lee Wallau, Inc. v. J.W. Landenberger & Co., 121 F.
Supp 555, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
21 Asbill &Snell, supra note 19, at 1145.
22

Id.

23 Henderson v. A.C. Spark Plug, 366 F.2d 389, 393 (9th Cir. 1966).

24 Asbill &Snell, supra note 19, at 1143-44.
25 Compare Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1964)
(question of fact for the jury), with Griswold v. Oil Capital Valve Co., 375
F.2d 532, 538 (10th Cir. 1966) (question of law for the court).
26

Brunswick Corp. v. Columbia Indus., Inc., 362 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir.

1966); Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Superior Indus., Inc., 332 F.2d 473, 477

(9th Cir. 1964); National Lead Co. v. Western Lead Prods. Co., 291 F.2d 447,
451 (9th Cir. 1961); Container Corp. of America v. M.C.S. Corp., 250 F.2d 707,
709 (9th Cir 1957).
27 Container Corp. of America v. M.C.S. Corp., 250 F.2d 707, 709 (9th
Cir. 1957).
28 National Lead Co. v. Western Lead Prods. Co., 291 F.2d 447, 451 (9th
Cir. 1961).
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tween the concepts of invention and validity. But in 1964, the court
encountered semantic difficulties when it said that "the finding of
validity, i.e., whether or not there is invention, is, of course, a matter
of law, not of fact." 29 The final reversal of the court's position came
in 1966 when the court stated flatly that "[t]he ultimate question
of patent validity is one of law."30 By making this statement, the
Ninth Circuit apparently adopted the position announced by the
United States Supreme Court.31 The Barofsky court, by disposing of
the case summarily, decided that the patent was invalid as a matter of
law. If it is assumed that the question of validity may be determined
as a matter of law in a proper case, the question remains whether,
under the circumstances of the Barofsky case, the issues should have
been disposed of summarily as a matter of law.
In the case of a design patent, the court has all the information
necessary to make its determination. The patent office supplies undisputed facts as to the constituent elements of the particular design.
The requirements for a design patent are well-settled. Therefore, in
order to determine whether the patent is valid, it first must be decided whether the undisputed design meets the undisputed requirements.
It has been argued that a dispute as to inferences, as distinguished
32
from a dispute as to facts, should not defeat summary judgment.
Such a position is a tenable one. In a jury trial, the function of the
jury is to find the facts and draw conclusions of law in accordance
with the instructions of the judge. The function of the judge, on the
other hand, is to give instructions which provide the proper inferences
from whatever possible factual disposition the jury might make of the
case. Patent cases may be tried either to court or to jury.33 Where
there is no jury, the judge makes the factual disposition and therefrom
draws the legal conclusions. But even in such a case, the summary
judgment problem is the same-there still must be no genuine issue
as to a material fact, and it must be proper to dispose of the case as a
matter of law.34 The Barofsky court was presented with undisputed
facts. It had merely to draw inferences therefrom as to whether the
29 Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Superior Indus., Inc., 332 F.2d 473, 477 (9th
Cir. 1964).
30 Brunswick Corp. v. Columbia Indus., Inc., 362 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir.
1966).
81 E.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); A & P Tea Co.
v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1950).

32 Asbill & Snell, supra note 19, at 1147.
33 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283 (1964); see, e.g., AMF Tuboscope, Inc. v. Cunningham, 352 F.2d 150, 153 (10th Cir. 1965), where the court held the plaintiff

entitled to a jury trial.
34

FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (c).
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legal requirements for obtaining a design patent were met. The court
conducted a detailed analysis of the patent in order to disclose the
reasoningby which it arrived at the proper legal conclusions. Hence,
on that basis, the decision seems sound.
To justify the position of the majority in the Barofsky case in
the foregoing manner is not to say that its disposition is beyond
criticism. The purpose of summary judgment is to promote economy
in the judicial process by disposing of the case without a trial where
a trial would not change the result. This economy necessarily must
be at the expense of a thorough consideration of all the ramifications
of the case. The weighing of these opposing considerations-economy
and thoroughness-necessarily involves certain value judgments.
Value judgments lead inevitably to instances of human error. The
judge must be sure that the result of the litigation would not be
different if the case were tried to the issues.3 5 Hence, the criticism

to which the Barofsky court is open is whether, giving the district
court the benefit of all doubt, the Ninth Circuit should have liberalized its legal function by affirming the judgment. That is, as
Judge Ely pointed out, the court had to resolve the phrase "primarily
functional" as a matter of law; it had to find a different basis than
that used by the lower court, and it had to rely on cases which did
not deal with summary judgment to reach its decision to affirm. 36
Summary judgment should be recognized for what it is-a tool for
economy in judicial proceedings. It is a luxury to be used sparingly.
It should be limited to cases which fall clearly within its definition.
Any extension is dangerous.
On the one hand, then, the Barofsky decision can be justified
through an application of general principles dealing with summary
judgment. On the other hand, the decision is open to some criticism.
Hence, the problem for the future is to decide whether the remedy
of summary judgment has been expanded by Barofsky. If it has
been expanded, the question is as to the degree. The Barofsky majority indicates a possible trend toward expansion of the remedy of
summary judgment at the expense of fewer trials to the issues; the
dissent admonishes against this end. The conflict thus defined has
no solution. It is the inevitable result of crowded court dockets and
the attempt to keep calendars clean. The design patent case is but
an instance of the greater problem thus encountered. The best one
can do is to identify the problem and leave it to the courts themselves
to attempt to resolve it in the future. It is the nature of the judicial
35 In this regard note that a patent, once issued, is presumed valid. 35
U.S.C. § 282 (1964). The burden of establishing validity is on the movant.
35 U.S.C. § 282 (1964).
30 396 F.2d at 345.
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system to entrust the courts with expanding interpretive power so
they can cope with the problems of a more complex society. We have
in this design patent summary judgment case but a specific instance
of a remedy in flux.
D.W.L.

